Economic reforms described the collection of policies to re-orientate economic activities in an attempt to re-direct the desired course of evolution of an economy. They were therefore aimed at altering the structure of an economic system for sustainable growth. Economic reforms in Nigeria had their genesis in the structural adjustment program instituted in 1986 to stem the tide of dwindling economic fortunes consequent upon the glut in the market for the country's main export resource as well as the management oversight of the oil-boom era. Economic regulation had been the general management philosophy in the period before and during the oil boom of the 1970s. Several other reform programs had succeeded the 1986 initiatives. Mostly, the reforms were directed at eliminating distortions in the various markets and relying on market forces for resource allocation and general macroeconomic decisions. Based on a descriptive analytical method, this study showed that the expectations of a smaller government size and a larger private sector were realized. Also, the remarkable expansion in the telecommunications and the education sectors were gains. A combination of low technical changes and little innovations appeared to explain the dwindling contributions of other activity sectors and the general inert economy.
Introduction
A country undertook economic reforms mostly when it had experienced pro- Attempts were made in 1982 to tackle the situation using control measures such as quantitative restrictions and exchange control. As these actions were influenced by the assumption that the problem was temporary, they became mere palliatives that escalated the problem through various sectors with the cumulated results indicated in the preceding paragraph. In essence, the declining oil export revenue translated directly to declining real growth and serious unemployment.
The first major comprehensive attempt at reforming the economy began in the fourth quarter of 1986 when the foreign exchange market was deregulated.
The deregulation of the banking sector soon followed and by 1988 when the policy components of the adjustment program unfolded, an interim tariff and excise tax system characterized by unprecedented low levels of rates had been put in place; the design of the tariff rates' was aimed at achieving uniformity by 1994. Several incentives for export promotion were introduced while subsidies to government owned enterprises were curtailed. The initial adjustment efforts were to be carried forward and sustained through a three-year economic consolidation and expansion program, several rolling plans, economic blue prints, policies on rule of law and equity, and public sector downsizing program.
Overall success ratings had been mixed calling forth an evaluation of the poli-O. Ogun DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1104242 3 Open Access Library Journal cies, programs and outcomes of the reforms in the country. The rest of the paper was organized as follows. Section 2 provided an insight into the theoretical basis of economic reforms while the section following presented an overview of the contents of the policies and programs implemented under the Nigerian reform process. Section 4 dealt with the outcomes while, the last section gave a concluding remark.
Framework of Analysis
At the initial phase of an economic reform, three broad categories of policies were evident-demand based, supply based and trade based. These could be further decomposed into four categories-demand management policies, exchange rate and production policies, structural policies and external financing policies. Demand management policies that were aimed at restraining aggregate demand and absorption were absolutely necessary during the early stages of a reform process. Exchange rate policy had expenditure switching effect on both the tradable and untradable goods while production incentive policy boost production and growth in the newly favored tradable goods' sector. External financing policies aimed at improving the supply of foreign funds and the management of external debt.
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The particular policies emphasized would be informed by the situation of a country. For countries where all of the above standard components of reforms were already in place, the reform effort might take the form of relieving structural rigidity by way of innovation policies through a restructuring of the national systems of innovation.
The impetus for economic reforms as implemented around the world took root from neo-classical economics which assumed that a country's economy should be open, with a competitive market; firms were expected to earn a profit without any external subsidy or protection. The World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) relying on the neo-classical economic theory advocated that governments in developing and transition economies should cut subsidies, liberalize prices, and privatize State Owned Enterprises (SOE).
Much of the economic theorizing behind the demand management component of a reform process was traceable to the analytical model developed by [1] .
The model could be explained using four sectors as fundamental structure of an economy: the private sector, government sector, foreign sector and domestic banking sector (which consisted of only the Central Bank). These sectors constituted the aggregate national accounts. The general principle was that, the value of production in the economy equals the value of incomes generated, or, in other words, income from production in each sector plus net transfers must equal expenditures plus savings. When the four accounts were totaled, the result was the national income identity:
These designs were motivated by the Bretton Wood institutions as subsequently discussed in the paper. 2 For details on the four accounts constituting the core of a country's system of national accounts, see [1] . 
where Y was national income (at market prices), C, was combined consumption of government and private sectors, I was investment of both sectors, and X and Z were exports and imports respectively. C + I indicated the amount of goods and services absorbed in the economy and came from domestic production (Y) and the net balance of the external sector. The four macro accounts helped to identify the relevant variables at play in a country's macroeconomic framework and were also helpful tools in the discussion of the issues involved in structural adjustment program. Their usefulness was illustrated by the two examples below.
Using the national balance equation and rewriting gives:
The equation showed that if the trade balance (X − Z) turned negative (e.g. re-
flecting an external shock such as a fall in the international terms of trade), this shock and the associated trade balance deficit must be adjusted either by a rise in Y or a decrease in absorption (C + I). As it was far more difficult to increase
African production levels (Y) in the short term, policy measures initially focused on reducing absorption (C + I), that is, aggregate demand in the economy. This demand-side stabilization was usually brought about by a combination of fiscal and monetary policies, largely within the domain of IMF activities.
An important question here was whether to make cuts primarily in consumption (C) or in investments (I). Unfortunately in practice in African terms, cuts in investments were often preferred and the politically far more sensitive consumption aggregate was usually left largely unaltered. The equation clearly showed that the necessary lowering of demand (belt-tightening) could be limited if Y (production level) could be simultaneously increased 3 . The required supply-side measures (largely the responsibility of WB) aimed to enhance growth in national production (including exports) and focused on policies that made resources work more efficiently and/or create additional production capacity in the economy.
Another example of how these macro identities could be helpful in identifying relevant policy issues involved the government budget balance. There was good reason to focus on the government (or public) sector as it was widely believed that rapid increases in government fiscal deficits in African countries should be considered an important source of macroeconomic imbalance. It followed that the approach to successful stabilization necessitated a reduced fiscal deficit. Referring to Equation (3) in the macroeconomic accounts of the model in [1] , the government budget restraint was presented as:
where, S g was government savings, I g was investment spending of government, 
The Nigerian Reform Process
This was organized under two major headings as follows.
The Background
The reform process in Nigeria could be segmented into two phases: the military governments' inspired processes and the civilian governments' initiatives. Although some laudable measures were introduced and notable institutions established during the military era, the general poor economic management of the period created several gaps in the reform agenda and further need for new initiatives. Thus, the background to economic reforms in the country could be summa- reference [4] ranked the country as the most volatile in the world for the period 1960 to 2000. Government expenditure closely followed current revenues, implying that fluctuations in oil earnings were transferred directly into the domestic economy. Fluctuations in public expenditure reflected both the over-reliance on oil earnings and weak fiscal discipline by previous governments. Volatile fiscal spending also tended to cause real exchange rate volatility. In particular, fiscal expansions financed by oil revenues often resulted in domestic currency appreciation, creating "Dutch-disease" concerns and reducing competitiveness of the non-oil economy [5] .
There were two other consequences of the volatile state of government ex- With respect to the external sector, the country's trade regime was for the two decades prior to economic reform described as complex, restrictive and opaque [7] . The tariff reforms under SAP that introduced uniform tariff rates became distorted by revisions occasioned by pressures from lobbies. And, at a general level, the country's institutions and governance were generally weak and ineffective as a result of deep-seated rent-seeking and corruption which had accompanied the advent of the oil boom of the 1970s. In a corrupt environment, resources for human capital development and other necessary investments e.g. infrastructure, were diverted. Poor household were disproportionately hurt in communities where corruption was most prevalent.
Analytical studies on the extent of corruption in Nigeria before the recent reforms were often very negative. A survey of Nigerian firms in 2002 revealed widespread bribery across various public institutions. About 70 per cent of firms surveyed reported the need for bribes to obtain trade permits, about 83 per cent paid bribes to obtain utility services, about 65 per cent paid bribes when paying taxes, an estimated 90 per cent paid bribes during procurement, and 70 per cent of firms acknowledged the need for bribes to obtain favorable judicial decisions. In addition, there was widespread perception of leakage of public funds [8] . Moreover, 100 per cent of Nigerian firms surveyed agreed that public funds were diverted to private groups in contrast to about 78 per cent of firms in Russia, and about 45 per cent of firms in South Africa. Finally, a federal government survey noted that prior to 1999, the government lost an average of about ₦40 billion (US$300 million) each year to corrupt practices in public procurement. This occurred in various forms: inflation of contract costs, award of contracts for non-existent projects, over invoicing, diversion of public funds to foreign banks, and low project quality because of the use of inexperienced contractors. Moreover, procurement costs in Nigeria were significantly higher compared with costs for similar projects in a neighboring country, Ghana.
Reform Measures
The measures were discussed according to the blocks recognized by the policy design. 
Macroeconomic Stability
The objectives of macroeconomic reform were: 1) to stabilize the Nigerian economy; 2) improve budgetary planning and execution, and 3) provide a platform for sustained economic diversification and non-oil growth. The policy thrust of the reform was to de-link public expenditures from oil revenue earnings by introducing an appropriate fiscal rule. As it was practiced in other countries, the adoption of such a rule could enable the accumulation of government savings, whether for precautionary reasons, for smoothening public expenditures, or for ensuring intergenerational equity [5] . An oil price-based fiscal dependence rule was introduced in which government expenditure was subjected to a prudent oil price benchmark. Any revenues that accumulated above the ref- 
Public Sector Downsizing
The main instruments of policy were privatization of SOEs and deregulation of government activities in some sectors that were expected to improve efficiency 
Civil Service Reform
Civil service reform began with five pilot ministries and subsequently extended to nine MDAs (ministries, departments and agencies). In each instance, internal consultations were made while verification exercises were conducted to update personnel records and payroll data. Organizational structures for the reforming ministries were reviewed and rationalized, while the appropriate professional skills needed were identified. Redundancy packages and retraining programs 
Banking Sector Reform
Though the deregulation reforms in Nigeria started in the fourth quarter of 1986 with the foreign exchange market, the reforms pertaining to the banking industry proper did not commence until January 1987. The first reform in the sector was the deregulation of rate of interest on loans and deposits. Thus, competition on price basis among banks was enabled. The interest rate deregulation was soon followed by a policy of free entry into the banking system. The immediate response of the system to these two policies was a surge in the number of banks- non-transferable and non-negotiable carried higher yield than treasury bills.
In order to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory authorities in the man- 
Trade Policy Reforms
Nigeria liberalized its import tariff regime by adopting the Common External
Tariff (CET) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
This was in keeping with the government's commitment to simplify the tariff structure and improve the transparency and predictability of Nigeria's trade policies [9] . Under the new ECOWAS tariff structure, Nigeria adopted a For example, the 50 per cent tariff was levied on goods in selected sectors in which the country had comparative advantage and aimed to support domestic production, such as vegetable oils and starch.
Overall, with the adoption of the ECOWAS CET, the simple (unweighted) average tariff rate declined from 29 to 18 per cent, while the weighted average tariff rate fell from 25 to 17 per cent. The CET had also simplified and improved the transparency of Nigeria's tariff structure. Generally, the focus of trade policy reforms had been export promotion through competitiveness of local industries.
Besides the tariff reviews, several incentives were introduced to boost export production. As described in the Export and Miscellaneous Provision Decree No. 
Institutional Reforms
Public procurement: Following an extensive review of public procurement systems, the government introduced a Value for Money audit or Due Process Mechanism (DPM) in public contracts. The DPM had promoted an open tenders process with competitive bidding for government contracts. Any projects exceeding ₦50 million (US$400,000) also required approval (i.e. a due process certification). To ensure competitive costing of contracts, a database of international prices was developed to serve as a guide during the bidding process. The government also published a public tender's journal periodically as a means of reducing patronage in the award of contracts. Finally, certification of completed government projects was also required before final payments could be made.
Public expenditure management: Poor public expenditure management in Nigeria greatly hampered the quality of government capital projects, resulting in poor service delivery to citizens. Oversight of public expenditures was further made difficult due to existing fiscal decentralization that allocated about half of total government revenues to states and local governments, with the remainder going to the federal government. While increased resource allocation to states and local governments might potentially encourage more direct interventions in pro-poor programs, capacity constraints and the lack of transparency at the subnational level posed serious challenges. To improve transparency at all levels of government, but particularly the sub-national level, a monthly publication of federal, state, and local governments' shares of revenue from the country's federation account was introduced in January 2004. The publication provided details of revenue allocations to all 36 state governments and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), as well as 774 local governments.
The oil and gas sector and the N-EITI initiative: The lack of transparency in the Nigerian oil and gas sector, particularly under previous military administrations, also presented a major challenge for economic governance. In 2003, Nigeria was among the first countries to adopt the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to help improve governance of the sector. One of the key acts of the EITI aimed at improving transparency was to commission an independent audit of the oil and gas sector from 1999 to 2004. This was an unprecedented exercise domestically, and Nigeria was the first country in the EITI initiative to commit to such an undertaking. The audit presented a number of instructive findings. Overall, 99.8 per cent of revenues in the sector were accounted for. The balance (that is, 0.02) per cent was within the conventional margin of error for such audits. However, the audit showed a history of poor record keeping. In the financial audit, only minor disparities were observed between revenues that oil companies reported as paid and the actual amounts received by the Central bank. Coordination among government agencies was however found to be weak and government record keeping was also poor such that reported revenues fluctuated: in some years, reported income exceeded what the Central bank received while in others, the reverse was the case. A physical audit also pointed to the systematic loss of crude oil between the wellhead and export metering terminals. Poor metering infrastructure also hampered proper data collection on gross volumes. Finally, the audit highlighted some concerns with the discretionary powers of the petroleum minister in oil block allocation arising from the Petroleum Act of 1969. The findings of the study were subsequently disseminated to the public while various remediation measures were implemented by the government.
Prosecuting corrupt practices: The government introduced two institutions to tackle corruption in the domestic business environment. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) were pursuing cases of corrupt practices such as Internet fraud and corruption in public office. There had been a number of high profile convictions: many advance fee fraud kingpins had been detained, two judges had been sacked and two others suspended, several legislators (including a past Senate president) had lost their legislative posts and were being prosecuted, three ministers had been dismissed, a former Inspector General of Police-the top law enforcement official in the country-had been tried, convicted and jailed for corruption, and three former state governors had been impeached by their state assemblies on account of corruption. EFCC investigations had made good use of the monthly revenue share publications mentioned earlier, highlighting the importance of information and transparency in the fight against corruption. EFCC and ICPC activities were gradually removing the concept of the untouchable "big man" in the country while re-establishing the rule of law for all. Overall, despite existing challenges, recent governance reforms appeared to have yielded some concrete results. Recent survey data from [8] indicated that there had been a reduction in the perception of corruption by Nigerian firms in obtaining trade permits, in paying taxes, in procurement, in the judiciary, in the leakage of public funds, and in money laundering.
Results
These were examined at two levels: direct and indirect effects. The direct effect was seen in terms of impact on the instruments while the indirect effect concerned sectoral performances and overall GDP growth.
Direct Effects
The relevant issues under this were as follows.
Macroeconomic Stability
There was a marked improvement in government's fiscal balance, with the pre- The liberalization of the telecommunication sector was particularly successful, resulting in an increase in the number of telephone lines in the country from about 500,000 landlines in 2001 to over 32 million GSM lines in 2014. The sector attracted over US$1 billion a year in investments between 2010 and 2014 and the country had been rated as one of those with the fastest growing teledensity in the world. The privatization and liberalization exercises had been controversial in part and fraught with a great deal of resistance from entrenched interests who were accustomed to diverting public resources for private gain. Though there were questions about the privatization of particular public enterprises (such as whether the process was fair and transparent, or whether private monopolies were being created), most of these issues had been settled and the exercise had been largely successful.
Financial Sector
Financial prices had been generally market determined and reflecting both endogenous and exogenous developments. Accordingly, there had been reduced tendency towards misalignment of the prices. Macroeconomic growth and stability as well as external trade and finance had been the ultimate beneficiaries.
Institutional and Governance Reforms
With the introduction of the DPM, there was noticeable improvement in the efficiency of capital spending. The federal government had saved over ₦200 billion Table 1 The relative performances of these sectors were further underscored by their contributions to real GDP in the periods under consideration. Table 2 provided the relevant statistics.
Indirect Effects
As could be deduced from the Table, might explain these unusual performance records. As at April 2014, the country had about 129 million active telephone subscribers, up, from the 50 million of the pre-reform era. Teledensity in the country stood at about 92 per cent as against the 0.4 per cent of the pre-reform period. 5 As at 2014, there were five active mobile phone companies operating in the country. Of this number, three had multinational links. Apart from telecommunications, another activity sector that recorded remarkable growth in the post-reform period was education. While policy liberalization stimulated rapid growth in the establishment of educational institutions at all levels, the developments in the tertiary segment were quite remarkable. In 1989, there were only 28 universities in the country consisting of 20 Federal institutions and the rest, states' owned. By the year 2010, the number of universities had risen to 104 with 27 Federal, 36 states and 41 private. It is interesting to note that before 1986, there was only one private university in the country. Both local and foreign capital were actively engaged in the sector especially at the secondary and tertiary levels.
It appeared that a major incentive for the apparent huge private investments in the educational sector was the high demand for education at all levels in the country. For example, in terms of absorption of applicants into universities, only 1988 (22 per cent) and 1989 (28 per cent) figures were above 20 per cent between 1979 and 2010. Whereas, the proportion was as low as 2 per cent in 2008, the number of applicants was as huge as about 1.15 million in 2009. 6 A sharp contrast to the story of telecommunications was the case of the manufacturing sector. As shown in Table 1 and Table 2 , both of its growth and contributions declined significantly over the two relevant periods. Some activities in the sector (e.g. textile) became marked by near-extinction. Textile was the leading export subsector in the country before and in the immediate periods after the initial reforms (that is, between 1986 and 1994). A combination of unfavorable politico-economic developments between 1994 and 1999 and the stiff competition from imported fabrics of the reform era appeared to explain the adverse development in the sector. Generally, the supply response (low technical progress) of the sector under the liberalization process had been very poor.
A slightly different explanation could be proffered for the somewhat slow 5 All information and data relating to the telecommunications sector were from the Nigerian Communications Commission, the National Bureau of Statistics and the International Telecommunications Union. 6 Figures quoted in respect of university education were from the Joint Admission and Matriculation Board and the National Universities Commission. recovery of the agricultural sector from the penalty imposed by the "Dutch disease" incidence of the oil boom and post oil boom era. Peasant farming characterized by small-holdings and the use of simple implements such as hoe and cutlass remained the general practice. Hence, its contribution to real GDP did not quite match up with its status as the residual occupation sector of the economy.
In terms of overall impact, Table 3 presented data on the performance of the major sectors of the economy as well as the general GDP growth in real terms.
As could be seen, agriculture appeared to be the only sector with consistent 
Concluding Observation
The Nigerian reform process had been quite extensive addressing the perceived growth inhibiting problems in every sector of the economy. The output responses of the different sectors varied with remarkable real growth recorded in only the telecommunications sector that appeared to have been propelled by the introduction of new technologies. Indeed, the slow supply responses of the other sectors appeared to be unconnected with little technical changes in the production and service delivery processes. This clearly calls for policy attention to ascertain the causes of the slow innovations and effect redress. Thus, future studies on this subject should be directed at investigating the sources of sectoral innovations.
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